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Report of the Committee on 
Physician-Assisted
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA
In 1994 the Board of the American Association of Suicidology selected a Com­
mittee on Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. It was asked to review 
the issues emerging in the growing controversy concerning euthanasia, physi­
cian-assisted suicide, palliative care, and the medical treatment of dying pa­
tients. Having discussed the issues together after extensively reviewing 
published materials, the committee now submits this report.
At this time, the committee recommends that the American Association of 
Suicidology take no positions on physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia. 
Further, we do not recommend the support of legislation, for or against, any 
of these matters. Quite apart from the diverging, deeply held moral and 
ethical positions on these issues that divide our organization and our society, 
much research is needed to answer many important questions before this 
association might properly take positions on these problems. Research can 
never answer all the wrenching questions associated with physician-assisted 
death, but it can certainly inform the debate. In this report, we identify some 
of the research questions, attempt to clarify the areas of difference, and 
highlight several sectors of the discussion that should be of concern to all who 
espouse positions, favorable or unfavorable, in matters of physician-assisted 
suicide and euthanasia.
We have decided to submit this "white paper" in spite of the reservations 
of some who fear that it is inappropriate for the American Association of 
Suicidology to speak out on these matters at all. It has been argued that ours 
is an organization the purpose of which is suicide prevention and the study 
of suicide. We are not a political organization, and the medical care of the 
dying is outside our purview. Most of the Committee believe, however, that 
the collective experience and knowledge that we can bring to the subject 
enable us to offer some perspective on these questions, and that though we 
cannot presume to settle them, we may offer some clarification and throw 
some light (no more heat is needed) on the controversies.
Since 1994 this committee has studied a voluminous amount of published 
material and we have been generously assisted through correspondence and 
discussion with Dr. Ira Byock, Dr. Herbert Hendin, and Dr. Timothy Quill.
THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
As the committee has tried to address its task, the breadth and intensity of the 
controversy have increased to such an extent that new books, newspaper 
commentaries, and articles appear almost daily. The sensational media treat-
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merit of the activities of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who has assisted in the suicides of 
a number of patients, has captured and even inflamed the imagination and the 
suspicions of the public. This is the stormy context in which we now submit our 
report.
A referendum approved by the citizens of Oregon in November of 1994 
permitting physicians to give prescriptions for lethal doses of drugs to incur­
able patients has been declared unconstitutional by the U. S. District Court. 
Similar referenda legalizing physician-assisted suicide and physician- ad­
ministered euthanasia failed in Washington, Michigan, Iowa, and California. 
Voters in other states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico, 
among others) are seeing or shortly will see similar measures on their ballots.
There are now seven distinct right-to-die societies in the United States, 
among which the most prominent are Choice in Dying, Americans for Death 
with Dignity, the Hemlock Society, and Compassion in Dying. For the most 
part these bodies advocate assisted suicide and euthanasia. By all indications 
the membership of these organizations is growing as public distrust of the 
health delivery system deepens.
Opposition to this movement comes from many sources, including the Ameri­
can Medical Association, the American Nurses Association, the American Geri­
atrics Society, the Roman Catholic Church, Hospice, the National Legal Center for 
the Disabled, and such groups as the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force. 
Individual, non-organizational opposition is strong. The two sides do not agree 
whether humane care for the terminally ill requires the legalization of assisted 
suicide or euthanasia.
Those foreign observers who have published studies of assisted suicide and 
euthanasia in the Netherlands (these practices are accepted there) have come to 
similar conclusions: Euthanasia, originally intended for exceptional circum­
stances, has become a common way for dealing with serious or terminal illness. 
Intended to provide greater autonomy for patients, euthanasia has actually 
increased physician's control over patients' deaths.
The Dutch government's own commissioned study shows that more than a 
thousand patients a year are given euthanasia without their consent. In a signifi­
cant number of cases annually physicians take actions that might end, or are 
intended to end, the lives of competent patients without any preliminary discus­
sion with them. The Dutch, who dislike the term "involuntary euthanasia," call 
such events "termination of the patient without explicit request."2 About three 
thousand cases of physician-assisted death (euthanasia or assisted suicide) in 
which the patient requests it are taking place in the Netherlands annually. This 
represents about 3% of all deaths in that country.3
The Dutch experience raises important questions about the possibility of 
abuses in the United States, though knowledgeable scholars from the Neth­
erlands do not believe there is any pattern of abuse in that country, which is 
culturally much more homogeneous. The U.S. health care system is frag­
mented and economically driven. Whereas in the Netherlands close relation­
ships between patients and physicians of many years standing are very usual, 
in this country patient-physician relationships have never been more imper­
sonal. At the clinical level, end-of-life decisions are surrounded by complex 
psychological and interpersonal, influences that are extremely difficult to
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assess in the absence of a close, long-lasting relationship between the patient 
and the physician,
GUIDING CONSIDERATIONS
Several important considerations have guided us that should be made explicit. 
First of all, there is profound disagreement among the membership of the 
American Association of Suicidology as to whether there is such a thing as 
rational suicide. There are thorny difficulties that turn on the precise meaning 
of commonly used words. The matter is difficult because the differences, though 
subtle, really matter. We have addressed the difference, for instance, between 
"reasonable" and "rational"- suicide.5 There are differences of meaning and 
nuance between expressions such as "physician-assisted suicide," "physician- 
assisted death," and "physician aid-in-dying "
Further, some hold that euthanasia has nothing to do with suicide, while 
others are convinced that in the context of terminal illness, the choice to die is 
essentially a choice of suicide.
Although euthanasia in the last days of life may have little to do with ordina ty 
suicide, clinical experience suggests that those patients who respond to crises 
of grave illness suicidally are not different from those who respond to other life 
crises in the same way.
The members of the American Association of Suicidology differ over funda­
mental political, cultural, and religious issues. We do not agree on the appro­
priate role of the law and the claims of society when they come into conflict with 
issues of individual liberty. Some of us believe that legitimization of euthanasia 
and assisted suicide without providing more sophisticated psychological safe­
guards than those that have been proposed in recent referenda will inevitably 
result in various kinds of abuse. Others are confident that well-planned legis­
lation will prevent abuse, or even that, by bringing physician aid-in-dying out 
into the open, legislation will protect against abuse of the terminally ill that is 
occurring now.
Plainly, full ethical consensus on issues of this magnitude cannot be reached 
by the committee nor the membership of the American Association of Suicidol­
ogy. Our cultural, political, ethical, and religious groundings are too diverse. 
Some agreement is nevertheless possible. The committee has a consensus that 
involuntary euthanasia can never be condoned, and we further agree that 
intolerable, prolonged suffering of persons in extremis should never be insisted 
upon, against their wishes, in single-minded efforts to preserve life at all costs. 
Apart from these two statements what you have before you is not a position 
paper. Some of those who reviewed earlier drafts of this report have detected 
a subtle bias in favor of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Others have 
detected an opposite bias. We have nevertheless tried to produce a balanced 
report. It is not our intention to influence premature closure on the discussion 
of these very difficult questions.
Every suicide is a complex matter. Even in cases where much clinical infor­
mation is available it is not possible to know all determinants. The issue is 
further complicated by the fact that self-performed or physician-assisted sui­
cides in terminal illness are not usually reported as such. Nevertheless, we do
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believe that more study is needed, and we are convinced that the interpersonal 
and psychological aspects of end-of-life decisions are often ill understood and 
overlooked.
The committee, aware of the intense public polarization that has occurred 
over the issue of abortion, senses that a comparable furor may arise over the 
subjects addressed in this report. Hoping to promote open and intelligent 
discussion of the issues, inside and outside our organization, it has tried to 
identify the principal points of agreement and disagreement at hand, even 
though members may differ respecting the ethical choices they may imply.
DEFINITIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
That controversy should arise in this difficult field of discussion is inevitable, 
but simple miscommunication has led to much unnecessary dispute. Many of 
the terms used in this debate mean different things to different people. For 
purposes of this report, we list here the committee's understanding of some of 
the basic terms. In order to clarify the application of these terms, we have 
annexed scenarios of imaginary cases to show what we mean.
Some readers of preliminary versions of this report have objected that the 
report in general, and the imaginary cases in particular, seem to legitimize, or 
excuse, euthanasia and physician-assisted death. We do not advocate for or 
against. Nevertheless, for this report, we do not shirk from the need to discuss 
euthanasia. The moral distinction between, on the one hand, providing a 
terminal, suicidal patient with a tank of carbon monoxide and a gas mask (for 
example), and on the other hand, holding that mask over the face of a pleading 
patient who, by virtue of disease, is incapable of holding the mask himself, is 
uncertain. To some, the distinction appears minor; to others, it is enormous. The 
former instance is, of course, physician-assisted suicide; the latter, euthanasia. 
Euthanasia is indisputably a type of homicide, but the moral issues associated 
with the two examples mentioned here are so related that to discuss physician- 
assisted suicide while shunning any discussion of euthanasia seems disingenu­
ous.
D eath  Associated w ith  Palliative Care
Death associated with palliative care is death due (at least in part) to medica­
tions and/or other treatment given to a patient for the explicit purpose of 
relieving suffering. Caregivers may be aware of the potential for death as an 
outcome of palliative care, but death is not the goal of palliative care.
The patient is a wasted 87-year-old man in an intensive care unit suffering 
from widely metastatic pancreatic cancer. He has received all the conven­
tional therapy and is now suffering intolerable pain and intense restless­
ness, unaffected by the usual doses of drugs. The physician knows higher 
doses of opiate combined with sedatives may suppress the patient's respi­
ration, but, having discussed the dangers with both the patient and his 
family, he administers larger doses anyway, explicitly recognizing that the 
goal of therapy at this stage is relief of pain, not prolongation of life. The
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patient's suffering is relieved, but he subsequently dies in his sleep during 
the night.
Suicide
Suicide is the act or an instance of deliberately taking one's own life.
A chronic alcoholic man has been drinking at home. His health is deterio­
rating, and he has recently lost his job. His children are grown and have 
moved away; his wife has left him. Despondent and suffering from clini­
cally diagnosable depression, he shoots himself in the head with the hand­
gun he keeps in his bedside drawer.
Assisted Suicide
Assisted suicide is the deliberate and knowing provision of information, the 
means, and/or help to another person for an act of suicide.
A 30-year-old homosexual patient who had witnessed the painful deaths 
of many of his friends suffering from AIDS himself developed late compli­
cations of the illness and was in considerable physical pain. The options of 
good palliative care had been fully described to him, and he understood 
them, but he said he did not want to lie drugged for weeks or more waiting 
for death, even if he was free from physical suffering. He asked the physi­
cian to give him a lethal prescription for barbiturates so he could kill himself 
at home. This the physician did.
Euthanasia
Euthanasia is the act or practice of causing the death of persons suffering from 
incurable conditions or diseases in order to alleviate or prevent uncontrollable 
suffering.
Active euthanasia has come to mean some deliberate action that results in the 
death of such a person. Passive euthanasia implies permitting the death of such 
a person by withholding action as a result of which death follows. (Withholding 
and/or withdrawing life sustaining treatment is an example of passive eutha­
nasia.)
Voluntary euthanasia implies that the person who is to die gives informed 
consent. Involuntary euthaniasia implies that the person who is to die refuses to 
give informed consent, or, when presumably competent, is never asked for 
consent. Involuntary euthanasia is a synonym for murder. Nonvoluntary eutha­
nasia implies that the person who is to die is incapable or incompetent to give 
informed consent.
An Example of Active, Voluntary Euthanasia. A 35-year-old musician lay 
immobile in bed, unable to swallow her own secretions, so deteriorated 
from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis that she could no longer eat or speak, 
but she remained able to nod her head. She had told her physician long 
before that when her disease reached this stage she did not want to live any
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longer, and had asked for a lethal injection to end her life. On several 
occasions he asked her if she now wanted the injection she had asked for 
before. Each time she nodded her head, "yes." With the full knowledge and 
consent of her family he gave her a lethal injection of barbiturates.
An Example of Passive, Voluntary Euthanasia. A 35-year-old musician lay 
immobile in bed, unable to swallow her own secretions, so deteriorated 
from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis that she could no longer eat or speak, 
but she remained able to nod her head. In this example the patient had told 
her physician long before that when her disease reached this stage she did 
not want to live any longer, and asked him then to withhold food and 
medicines so she would die. The physician asked the patient on several 
occasions if she was ready to die, and she consistently nodded her head to 
signal yes. He obtained the consent of the family and discontinued the tube 
feedings, though the patient was given small amounts of cracked ice orally 
to keep her comfortable. She died in a few days.6
An Example of Active, Nonvoluntary Euthanasia. A wasted 87-year-old man 
is dying in an intensive care unit, diagnosed with widely metastatic pan­
creatic cancer. He has received all conventional therapy, and is suffering 
from intolerable pain unaffected by high doses of morphine normally 
considered safe. The physician knows higher doses of morphine may 
. suppress the patient's respiration. The patient is confused but obviously in 
pain, shifting in and out of delirium, unable to understand and unable to 
give consent. There are no known family or friends. The physician admin­
isters a lethal dose of sedative, with the explicit intent of causing the 
patient's death to end his suffering.
PR O B L E M  A R E A S
Among the difficult issues around which controversy builds, the committee 
was able to identify four about which we wish to offer some comment. These 
are general socioeconomic and cultural considerations, the difficulties in assess­
ing and treating depression in patients who wish to die, the unsettled questions 
concerning the efficacy of palliative care, under ideal as well as ordinary 
circumstances, and some practical remarks concerning assisted suicide in the 
absence of a physician.
Social, C ultural, and  O ther G eneral C onsiderations
Hie identification of persons who might be eligible to request physician-as­
sisted death would inevitably be influenced by the evolution of social and 
medico-legal consensus. The terminally ill are widely identified as a suitable 
class for assisted dying, but others may come to be included as appropriate 
candidates, according to the way they are regarded by others. In Holland more 
than one patient with intractable depression who persisted in her wish to die 
was afforded euthanasia (e.g., the Chabot case). The participating physician was 
convicted of a criminal offense on technical grounds but never punished.7
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Offering euthanasia or assisting in the suicides of psychiatric patients is repug­
nant to many; the great majority of psychiatrists in the United States would find 
such a policy repellent, and would recall the extermination of chronic psychi­
atric patients under the Nazi regime, although admittedly most such deaths 
were hardly voluntary.8 Some argue that the victims of slow, deteriorating 
illnesses not necessarily immediately terminal (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, 
for instance) should be afforded assistance in dying if they wish it.
The life conditions of socially and economically disadvantaged persons in 
American society invite depression, discouragement, and sometimes despair. 
There would appear to be no small risk that the socially and economically 
advantaged would find it economically tempting to encourage premature death 
for their disadvantaged counterparts, or that the poor, ignorant, and disadvan­
taged would be too ready to give up on themselves. Life events and the nature 
and extent of available social supports are well understood to influence both 
the onset and the outcome of depressive disorders and suicidal states.
In the United States good health care is unavailable to many, especially to 
poor or near-poor people. Medical services are delivered impersonally, often 
on a catch-as-catch-can basis, and few low-income persons have long-standing 
relationships with a physician who knows them well. The practice of medicine 
is in an economic crisis, and the current development of so-called managed care 
favors the delivery of the least care possible. Euthanasia and assisted suicide 
would be good business for many insurers, reducing the overall cost of care for 
expensive patients in nursing homes and other chronic-care facilities.9 • 
Many who request assistance in suicide (and who support the legalization of 
physician-assisted suicide) fear burdening their families financially, and want 
to die sooner, rather than later, to preserve family resources. Inevitably, some 
family members would become enthusiastic for assisted-suicide or euthanasia 
for reasons of personal financial gain. In the United States people are routinely 
pauperized when they fall seriously ill and do not die quickly. Health care 
reform needs to address this issue; financial suffering in the sick and dying can 
be remedied by means other than dying quickly if federal and state govern­
ments will pay attention.
Research shows that in the United States men commit suicide about three 
times more often than women. Perhaps this is because Americans view suicide 
as an act of independent self-determination, something inherently masculine. 
Should suicidal death take on the color of passive compliance, would it seem 
more acceptably feminine? Would a physician's assistance make suicide more 
permissible and acceptable for women? 0 
Systematic data on physician-assisted suicide in the United States are unavail­
able, but a number of cases have been described in newspapers and in profes­
sional periodicals. We found one study reporting on characteristics of persons 
who asked for assisted suicide. In this report physicans were asked to give 
information about the last one or two patients who had asked for help in dying. 
Sixty percent were men, and the physicians complied with about a fourth of 
these requests. No information was given on whether physicians were more 
likely to comply with women's or men's requests for assisted death, nor was it 
learned whether women were more likely than men to actually take the medi­
cine prescribed for use in suicide.11 Kevorkian's cases have been the most 
widely publicized. Most of his assisted suicides have been women, a majority
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of whom were between forty and sixty years old. Though poor health was 
mentioned as a factor in all, a third of Kevorkian's cases were not terminally ill. 
Obviously Diane, the patient whose suicide was assisted by Dr, Quill, was a 
woman.
The available evidence, though unsystematic, raises the question as to 
whether women may be more likely to feel (and to be made to feel) obligated 
to kill themselves when they are sick, especially if they are old. There is evidence 
to suggest that Americans are more likely to feel that an elderly woman's 
decision to commit suicide is more reasonable than a man's,12 Most American 
physicians are men, and it has been claimed that death by suicide is more 
acceptable to men than it is to women.13 Do not these findings suggest the 
likelihood that because of prevalent social attitudes physicians would be more 
likely to take at face value a woman's request for assistance in death than a 
man's?
In the United States more elderly women than elderly men are poor, wid­
owed, live alone, suffer from chronic illness, and have limited access to medical 
insurance and family care. They would appear to be at great risk either to be 
pressured, or to feel pressured, into suicide or euthanasia to relieve others of 
the financial and emotional burden of caring for them,
A number of recent studies document the attitudes and practices of U, S. 
medical personnel concerning assisted suicide and euthanasia. Physicians ap­
pear to be divided on the question of legalization, with 31% to 60% expressing 
neutral or positive attitudes towards legalizing these practices.14 From 12% to 
21% of surveyed physicians reported having been asked for a prescription of a 
lethal dose of medicine. Two to seven percent complied.*5 Finally, a 1996 study 
of U, S. critical care nurses found that 17% had received requests for assistance 
in suicide or euthanasia from patients or family members, and 20% of the nurses 
reported engaging in such practices.16
Additional research is needed to address such questions as these: What 
influence do concurrent life stressors have on attitudes toward death in the 
terminally ill? How can those events and their impacts be reliably measured? 
Do terminally ill women and men evaluate life stressors differently? Do the 
composition and extent of terminally ill persons' social support networks 
influence their attitudes toward suicide and euthanasia? Are women more 
likely to perceive themselves as a burden when ill? What impact is the choice 
of assisted death likely to have on important relationships between the dying 
and others close to them, and on the course and outcome of bereavement for 
the survivors?
The Problem s C oncerning D epression
Depression is among the thorniest problems in the thicket around issues of 
physician-assisted death. The word depression ranges in meaning from ordinary 
sadness to a major psychiatric syndrome, but some level of low spirits, even if 
not a lw ays  a t  the level of significant clinical depression, is almost always 
present in those who face the end of their lives. The need to distinguish normal 
grief or sadness from its potentially treatable, pathological variants is one of the 
challenges facing those who wish to legalize physician-assisted death.17 For 
example, Oregon's now defunct Measure #16 forbade physicians' issuing lethal
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prescriptions until it was shown that "the patient is not suffering from a 
psychiatric or psychological disorder, or depression causing impaired judg­
ment".18 One of the Court's findings in striking down this measure was that 
treating physicians are poorly equipped to discern whether a patient's judg­
ment is impaired because of depression or some other mental disorder. Measure 
16 left this very important determination to treating physicians alone, and failed 
to require consultation with psychiatrists or psychologists.19
Inasmuch as depression is widespread among those suffering terminal ill­
nesses, the correct diagnosis of clinical depression is the paramount concern of 
those who must identify psychiatric or other disorders that may impair judge­
ment in those who seek a voluntary death. Among patients with advanced 
cancer, for example, at least a fourth have significant symptoms of clinical 
depression.20
Beyond sadness, clinical depression is characterized by a series of symptoms 
that often may be as readily ascribed to the patient's medical condition, or the 
treatment of the condition, as well as to any primary depression as such.
Many depressed patients have little or no insight into their disorder, and the 
more elderly often deny any mood disturbance, though the other indicia of 
depression are evident. Many patients have demonstrable cognitive changes— 
thinking is slowed, decision-making difficult and labored, and I, Q. falls. Many 
physically compromised elderly patients abuse alcohol or prescription drugs 
that can profoundly alter thinking and impair decision making processes.21
Primary care physicians fail to diagnose clinical depression in at least half 
their ambulatory patients who suffer from it.22 They are not demonstrably 
better at identifying even the more severe cases of depression. Its assessment in 
patients with terminal illness is complicated, but certainly possible. Certainly 
the assessment and treatment of depression in the seriously physically ill can 
be taught, and the treatment is usually effective.
ASSESSMENT
Characteristic depressive symptoms include loss of interest in usually pleasur­
able activities, loss of appetite and energy, sleep disturbance, and difficulty 
concentrating, as well as psychomotor slowing, feelings of worthlessness, and 
thoughts of death.23 Depressed persons complain more of diffuse physical 
symptoms and show less tolerance for functional limitations and for pain than 
those who are not. Pain and the nutritional and metabolic effects of physical 
illness may themselves cause clinical depression, as may many commonly used 
medications (e.g., chemotherapeutic agents and analgesics). Among the risks 
for critically ill persons' seeking a physician's assistance in an early death, 
therefore, is the chance that their physical symptoms may be incorrectly attrib­
uted exclusively to depression. On that basis the request for assistance in dying 
might be denied. Conversely, symptoms resulting entirely or partially from a 
clinical depressive disorder may be incorrectly attributed to the terminal physi­
cal condition. Suicide or euthanasia might follow without a treatable depres­
sion's recognition and treatment. Additional research and training are needed 
if physicians' ability to distinguish depression as a natural response to dying 
from depression as an independent syndrome is to improve.
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Further complicating the problem is the fact that we are oniy beginning to 
learn about the prevalence of suicidal thoughts or wishes in people with 
terminal illness. Neither do we know to what extent the presence of such 
thoughts is correlated with expressed suicidal behavior, nor how wishes for 
death in the critically ill relate to depressive illness. About 5% of the total 
population at any given time suffers from major depression with some level of 
suicidal thinking. From this it must follow that some fraction of terminally ill 
patients will suffer from clinical depressions that coincide with their illnesses 
but do not arise from them. Such patients are likely to attribute their depression 
and suicidal thinking to their terminal illnesses, however.
The few studies that have been conducted of patients nearing death suggest 
that suicidal ideation rarely occurs in the absence of a clinical depressive 
syndrome.24 The available data are scant. Clinical experience suggests, how­
ever, that though patients in severe pain may ask to be put out of their misery, 
they often change their minds when the pain is treated. Much additional 
research into these questions is needed.
The presence of a mental disorder may certainly impair the ability to make a 
reasoned decision about ending one's life. In its most extreme form, clinical 
depression can have a profound impact on rational thinking. In the less severe 
forms that are more characteristic of terminal physical illness, however, little is 
known about the influence of depressive symptoms on rational thought and 
end-of-life decisions.25 Neither have we as yet developed reliable (consistently 
reproducible) means for the assessment of that influence. How then are we to 
assess a terminally ill person's capacity (mental competence) to request assis­
tance in dying in the face of mild, moderate, or severe mood disturbance? 
Lacking tools, clinicians ordinarily assume that mild forms of mood disturbance 
do not impair judgement about end-of-life decisions, just as they often assume 
that more severe clinical depressions do. Neither assumption may be correct. 
We need further research, therefore, if we are to understand how depression 
and its associated affective states (e.g., hopelessness) influence decision making 
in the face of terminal illness.
TREATMENT
Many argue that when significant symptoms of a mood disorder are present, 
treatment should be attempted before any request for assistance in dying is 
granted. With resolution of the depressed state, it is argued, the capacity to 
weigh the available options (including assisted death) may improve, and the 
attitude toward death may change.
There is a tendency to take a dying person's request for help in dying at face 
value, and to assume that the principal determinants of the request are those 
the patient names—the inevitability of death, the deteriorated quality of life, 
discomfort, and others. Mental health professionals are well aware that uncon­
scious motives may color such decisions, however, and that requests for help 
in dying are multidetermined.
Many carefully conducted studies show that approximately 80% of persons 
with clinical depression will respond to treatment with medications and/or 
psychotherapy. Clear guidelines exist for prescription and conduct of antide­
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pressant treatments.26 But severely medically ill patients have rarely been 
included in depression research because of their greater sensitivity to side 
effects and drug interactions, and because their response to treatment is far 
more difficult to measure. In general, treatment of depression in the terminally 
ill with both medications and psychotherapy is more complex, and requires 
more technical expertise, than the treatment of patients with uncomplicated 
depression. Anxious not to compound their patients' discomfort, even those 
physicians who correctly diagnose clinical depression often provide less than 
optimal treatment for it, unreasonably fearing the side-effects of antidepressant 
drugs, and leaving the depression untreated, or only partially treated.
It is not true that the most pain-ridden, physically most distressed terminally 
ill patients are more likely to become depressed or suicidal when compared to 
others less afflicted. Many physicians and nurses are not aware of this fact, and 
it confuses their judgement.
Obviously problems exist at a number of levels. Not only do health care 
providers require more extensive training in the treatment of depression in the 
terminally ill, but research has yet to be conducted that supplies the knowledge 
on which that training should be based. (The palliative medicine literature 
includes some valuable research and discussion on depression in the terminally 
ill, but more needs to be done.) Among the questions that remain to be ad­
dressed by research are these: What forms of depression should be expected to 
respond to treatment in the terminally ill? What psychotherapies are most 
effective for their treatment? What pharmacotherapeutic approaches are most 
effective, and how can risks be minimized? What constitutes "adequate" treat­
ment of depression in the face of terminal illness, after which no further hope 
of response should be expected?
Further Research Needs: Other Unanswered Questions
When someone requests assistance in dying, we may assume multiple forces 
determine the choice, and that depression or other psychiatric difficulties are 
likely to be only some among many considerations. We need to grasp as much 
as we can about all these influences if we are fully to understand and to come 
to some sensible judgement about the reasonableness of any given request. 
Among others, there will be factors pertaining to the terminal condition itself, 
factors intrinsic to the individual, and factors arising from the psychosocial 
environment.
Characteristics of the terminal condition that may influence decisions to ask for 
help in dying are the nature and extent of its associated pain, the level of 
functional disability, and possibly neurobiological changes resulting from the 
illness or its treatment that influence behavior and/or cognitive processes.
We have long understood that pain and disability may precipitate depression 
and, among the terminally ill, suicidal thinking.2 Furthermore, physicians in 
general tend to underestimate the analgesic needs of critically ill patients. No 
data are available, however, regarding the proportion of undermedicated indi­
viduals who would still choose physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia were 
more effective pain control and illness management available to them. Physi­
cians need better education not only about the recognition and assessment of
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depression, but they need better training about pain management and analgesic 
strategies.
Recent advances in research on the psychobiology of self-destructive behav­
iors strongly suggest that alterations in brain neurochemistry underlie aggres­
sive suicidal acts.28 Similar evidence suggests a neurobiological etiology for 
some depressive disorders. No consideration has yet been given by researchers 
to the question of whether disease or treatment associated neurobiological 
changes may contribute to the emergence of the wish for death in some seriously 
and terminally ill people. This too is an area of high priority for future research.
Characteristics of the individual that may influence the election of assisted 
suicide or euthanasia arise from personality organization and previous life 
experience. Several studies have identified a distinctive pattern of personal 
traits among men with cancer who took their own lives.2 Others have noted 
the influence that having lost a loved one to debilitating illness may play in the 
survivor's end-of-life decisions.30 We lack any studies that address the place of 
such considerations in motivating patients who request assistance in dying. 
This lack is coin plica tod by the fact that many suicides and assisted suicides in 
terminal illness are not reported as such. Such cases are very difficult to 
assemble for study.
Questions remaining to be answered by research include: Are people with 
certain personality traits or temperaments more likely to ask for assisted suicide 
or euthanasia in the face of terminal illness than individuals with a different 
personality structure? Do the associated factors influencing that choice differ 
between individuals as a function of that personality style? How would the 
nature of one's past experience with serious physical illness (e.g., observing a 
parent die a painful death with cancer, or intimate knowledge of one who 
committed suicide under such circumstances) influence one's personal atti­
tudes towards suicide or euthanasia?
Ignorance R especting Palliative Care
The committee agrees that American medicine has failed sufficiently to develop 
and promote the intelligent practice of palliative care. Because much remains 
unknown, there is a good deal of controversy between able but differing 
experts. Dr. Ira Byock, a Hospice-associated physician who opposes the legali­
zation of physician-assisted suicide, claims that virtually all terminal suffering 
can be relieved with currently available methods of palliative care if they are 
used correctly.31 On the other side, Dr. Timothy Quill, the well-known physi­
cian who provided a lethal dose for his leukemia patient Diane and published 
an account of the case in The New England Journal of Medicine, estimates that, 
although the vast majority of dying patients die comfortably (or at least toler­
ably) when good palliative care is available, some do not. For these he believes 
physician-assisted death should be available when palliative care does not 
work.32 Some claim that about 15% of terminally ill patients die miserably even 
with the best palliative care. Others insist that this is an overstatement. Though 
Quill and Byock agree that physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia should not 
be substituted for good palliative care, they disagree about how to approach 
those few patients who are threatened with terrible suffering in spite of the 
usual palliative measures. For these Quill advocates physician assisted suicide
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or euthanasia; Byock believes that the exceptional case can be managed with 
deep sedation.
To argue thal pain control is the only issue in the controversy between 
palliative-care partisans and assisted-suicide/euthanasia partisans is to over­
simplify a complex matter. Studies of voluntary active euthanasia in the Neth­
erlands show that pain is not the only issue—in only 5% of the cases was pain 
the sole reason for the patients' applications for assisted death, though it was a 
factor in a much larger proportion.33 A most important issue is the matter of 
patient autonomy. In facing inevitable death, has the dying patient no right to 
meet it as he or she will? And what of the role of depression? Can depressed 
patients (many seriously ill and dying patients are depressed) really make 
competent, autonomous decisions? Byock argues that all physical suffering can 
be controlled with presently available means in all circumstances (profound 
sedation or in extreme cases anaesthesia could be employed).
All physical distress can be controlled....Certainly some small percentage 
of patients will have to accept sedation for the control of physical distress. 
Percentages of patients requiring terminal sedation also vary but will be 
fairly small. But there are no patients for whom combination of analgesia 
and sedation would not be effective at producing a comfortable sleep 
state.34
Byock's remarks throw doubt on the assertion that pain and discomfort 
cannot be alleviated under optimal circumstances, but it would appear that 
optimal palliative care cannot be taken for granted in the United States. Physi­
cians are often ill-prepared to provide sophisticated programs of counseling, 
analgesia, and sedation. Some physicians confuse adequate palliative care, in 
which drugs are given only with the intent to preserve comfort, with euthanasia, 
and fail to treat pain adequately for fear patients will die. Though ignorance of 
the principles of good palliative care is probably the primary reason, there may 
be other attitudinal (countertransference) problems that interfere with good 
management of the dying.
It is also argued that even could pain and suffering be fully controlled, 
prolonged sedation of a terminally ill patient for whom there is no hope for 
recovery is equivalent to or morally worse than euthanasia. Profound sedation 
(anaesthesia) in effect suspends patients' conscious existence, sometimes, per­
haps, without their full consent. All such patients die because they can neither 
eat nor drink, unless supplied artificially. Many feel that prolonged sedation 
that will end only in death is pointless and repugnant. 5 There are many 
differences of opinion as to this point of view.
The question of nonphysical suffering is a complicated one. When it is alleged 
that pain cannot be controlled, it is essential to consider whose pain, and the 
nature of the pain. Is the distress physical or emotional? If it is emotional, can 
it be alleviated by counseling or psychoactive medicine? If the pain is not the 
patient's, but that of others, what assistance can be offered them?
There is a tendency to view the emotional suffering of the terminally ill as 
somehow qualitatively different from the emotional suffering of others who are 
physically well. There is probably no such qualitative difference. In the absence 
of terminal physical illness the solution that suicide or euthanasia offers to
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emotional suffering does not ordinarily offer itself as an acceptable alternative. 
No one proposes physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia for the chronically 
abused and mistreated or those caught in intolerable socioeconomic circum­
stances.
The claim that upwards of 15% of terminally ill patients suffer miserable 
deaths needs clarification and elucidation. Is the misery to which reference is 
made the misery of the patient, or does it include the misery of onlookers? 
Are some deaths that look bad to observers not really so hard for the patient? 
Under what circumstances does the misery and suffering take place, and 
whose is it?
When patients can die in reasonable comfort the last weeks and days of their 
lives are often marked by remarkable personal integration and growth. 
Energetic reminiscence often takes place, farewells are said, self-forgiveness 
and self-acceptance rise, and old angers and hurts are let go. Patients can be 
seen to grow in peace and in wisdom. So can the surrounding families and 
friends. Premature interruption of life by ill-timed medical interventions may 
deprive dying persons and those who are close to them of opportunities for 
major personal maturation.36 At the same time, reports from the Netherlands 
suggest that patients who chose an assisted death may also undergo pro­
foundly meaningful experiences of summation and leavetaking.
We plainly need more research to characterize the nature of terminal care 
as it is practiced, and to establish what the limitations may be of optimal 
palliative care. The education of physicians in this area is woefully insuffi­
cient.
Specific Problems Associated with Physician-Assisted Suicide
To date most of the discussion of physician-assisted suicide presumes a scenario 
in which a physician, having agreed with a patient that suicide is reasonable, 
often supported by the opinion of an independent consultant, gives the patient 
a prescription for a deadly amount of a suitable drug. Filling it, the patient 
proceeds to take an overdose, either orally, or by injection, in the physician's 
absence.
While this committee does not endorse physician-assisted suicide, we are 
aware that little attention has been paid to the high likelihood of serious 
accidents inherent in such a scenario. Vomiting may occur as the patient slips 
into a coma, with aspiration of the vomitus. Should isolated patients change 
their minds they may nevertheless choke to death in a panic, or, if rescued, die 
of pneumonia. In the absence of the physician, those who attend patients in their 
suicides will usually be untrained to deal with such complications as aspiration. 
For instance, morphine, barbiturates, or other compounds from time to time 
produce states of confusion. Confused patients in states of intoxication may 
experience terror, panic, or become assaultive. And what are friends and 
relatives to do should the suicidal patient, slipping into a coma, change his 
mind, and beg for rescue?
If physician-assisted suicide is ever to be legitimized, does good medical 
judgment require that it should never be carried out in the absence of a 
physician? It may be argued that if a physician is in attendance, and if the 
physician is prepared to intervene to bring about the patient's death in the event
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that a self-administered dose is insufficient or results in vomiting, panic, or 
assault, there is little moral difference for the physician between actively 
providing euthanasia, or assisting at a suicide.
It can be further argued that providing a patient a lethal prescription and then 
absenting oneself from the bedside thrusts inappropriate responsibility on the 
untrained friends or family who may be present when the patient attempts to 
die. To be taken into account are the emotional impact on those who witness 
the suicide, the subsequent risk for their self-reproach, or the possible conse­
quences should one or more of the witnesses be overcome with feeling and try 
to abort the attempt. Were a physician present when a suicide attempt went 
wrong, he might be prepared actively to intervene and provide euthanasia if 
necessary.
Others argue that the presence of the physician would put pressure on the 
patient to end his life. If no physician is in attendance, it is easier to change one's 
mind. Ambivalence is inevitably present in such situations, goes the argument. 
The physician should do nothing to tip the balance in the direction of death, 
even by standing by when the patient prepares to take his life, since the doctor's 
presence might make it more difficult to delay.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The committee recommends tha t the American Association of Suicidology
take no position on physician-assisted death nor euthanasia.
2. At present we cannot recommend the support of legislation on these
matters, either favoring physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, or for­
bidding it. Much research is needed further to elucidate too many impor­
tant unanswered questions.
3. We urge that the American Association of Suicidology form its own
continuing study committee further to examine these issues, to assess and 
promote continuing research, and, if appropriate^ to offer further reports 
in the future.
4. We recommend that the American Association of Suicidology develop
educational programs on these subjects. A special day in the annual 
preconference program with special invitations to knowledgeable partici­
pants is also suggested.
5. We recommend that the American Association of Suicidology work with
medical and nursing organizations, psychological and gerontological or­
ganizations, schools, and other interested groups to promote the study, 
development, teaching, and availability of good palliative care.
6. We recommend that the American Association of Suicidology work with
medical and nursing organizations, psychological and gerontological or­
ganizations, schools, and other interested groups to ensure that physi­
cians, nurses, psychologists, and other caregivers are properly trained and 
sensitized to the need for respecting patients' wishes regarding their care 
in the event of terminal or otherwise grave illness. Patients need help to 
make their wishes known before such conditions develop. Broader and 
fuller understanding of "living wills," health-care power of attorney 
documents, and similar instruments are needed.
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